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Should the Prosecution Be Allowed to Comment on
a Defendant's Pre-Arrest Silence in Its Case-inChief?
I.

INTRODUCTION

You have the right to remain silent'-or so you thought. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one of the most
important protections of individual rights in the United States' legal
system.' The framers of the Constitution enacted this privilege in
order to protect individuals from a long history of oppression by the
State in interrogations and from other abuses of State authority. 3 The
privilege is based upon the belief that the government may not penalize
individuals merely for declining to answer possibly incriminating
questions. 4 Today, in large part due to the popularity of police and
law related television shows and movies, the right to remain silent is
one of the best known constitutional rights.5 Most defendants
exercising the privilege before trial do not entertain the possibility that
their silence may be used against them at trial.6
While most Americans may view the right to remain silent as an
inalienable right protected by the United States Constitution, certain
circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals have held that
prosecutors may use silence occurring before arrest in their case-inchief to imply the defendant's guilt.7 In United States v. Thompson,8
a recent Ninth Circuit decision, the defendant shot and killed a man in
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of Miranda, see
infra Part II.D.
2. See LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 431-32 (1968). The Fifth
Amendment provides in part that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 431.
4. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
5. See Margaret Zack, You Have the Right: 30 Years Later, Miranda Ruling Protects
Suspects, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 30, 1996, at 17A.
6. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Evidentiary Use of Silence and the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 210 (1984).
7. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Simon, 964 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (1lth
Cir. 1991); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Carter, 760 F.2d 1568 (1 1th Cir. 1985); United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233
(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).
8. 82 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996).
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his home during a drug deal. 9 When the police arrived, the defendant
refused to answer some police questions, because he was scared and
wanted to talk to a lawyer."'
In his closing argument, the prosecutor made the following
comment concerning the defendant's refusal to answer police
questions before his arrest:
I am not going to make a big deal out of Mr. Thompson's
response when the police come[sic] to the door following the
shooting. I'm not going to make a big deal about it at all. But
you got to admit, it's a little strange under the circumstances,
have the police come in there, and the first thing they're going
to say is "What happened?" "I want a lawyer." I mean, that's
strange. That's not the way that people in circumstances that
are legitimate are going to react. They would probably be
inclined to tell the cop what happened; "This guy broke into
my apartment." None of that happened. But then again, this is
Mr. Thompson."
The defendant in Thompson argued that this comment violated his
privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth
Amendment.' 2 Due to the absence of controlling Supreme Court
precedent 3 and the existence of a significant split among the circuit
courts on the issue,' 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
9. See id. at 851. The defendant told police the victim threatened to murder him for
$100 that the defendant owed the victim. See id.
10. See id. at 854. The defendant answered most questions, but refused to answer
three. See id. The detective who interviewed the defendant testified that he was "kind of
at a loss at that response because from my observations at the apartment, I assumed that
he had possibly shot somebody that broke into his apartment, and normally under those
circumstances, people I talk with are more than eager to tell me what happened." Id.
11. Id. at n.7. This statement was the final comment in the prosecution's closing
argument. See id.
12. Id. Since the defendant did not properly object to these comments, the court
reviewed for plain error. See id. at 854-55. "Plain" error is synonymous with "clear" or
"obvious" error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). The Thompson
court quoted a Second Circuit decision: "'we do not see how an error can be plain error
when the Supreme Court and this court have not spoken on the subject, and the authority
in other circuits is split."' Thompson, 82 F.3d at 855 (quoting United States v. AlliBalogun, 72 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1995)). The Thompson court stated that this
"commonsense conclusion" should apply in the Thompson case. See id.
13. See Thompson, 82 F.3d at 855. The court stated that the Supreme Court decisions
coming closest to the issue were Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609 (1965), and Jenkins
v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). See id. The court distinguished Griffin by pointing
out that the holding in Griffin only applied to post-arrest, coercive situations. See id.
The court distinguished Jenkins by pointing out that Jenkins had waived his Fifth
Amendment rights by testifying, whereas Thompson did not. See id. For a discussion of
Griffin and Jenkins, see infra Part II.E.
14. See Thompson, 82 F.3d at 855. See also infra Part III (discussing in detail the
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Circuit held that the trial court's failure to exclude the prosecutor's
comment was not "plain error" and that the defendant's conviction was
not reversible on those grounds.15
This comment will begin by discussing the origin of the privilege
against self-incrimination in England 16 and outline its development in
the United States. 7 Next, it will explain the policy reasons behind the
privilege.' 8 The comment will then discuss the history of the privilege
and the rules concerning the use of a defendant's silence in the
Supreme Court.' 9 It will then address the different treatment in the
circuit courts regarding the use of pre-arrest silence in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. 20 Finally, this comment will propose that
the use of the defendant's pre-arrest silence in the prosecution's casein-chief should be inadmissible.2'
II.BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Privilegein England
The roots of the controversy leading up to the recognition of the
privilege against self-incrimination can be traced to thirteenth century
England.22 The ecclesiastical courts of England adopted a procedure
known as the oath ex officio. 3 The oath contained a sworn statement
by the defendant promising to give honest answers to all questions
asked of him. 24 While the oath was disguised as an inquiry, the clear
split in the circuit courts).
15. Thompson, 82 F.3d at 856. The court stated that it did not intend to express any
opinion on the constitutionality of the prosecutor's comments in its holding. See id.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Parts II.D-E.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Parts IV-V.
22. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250, at 267-70
(John T. McNaughton, rev. ed., 1961).
23. See MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 6 (1946). The oath ex officio was the creation of Pope
Gregory IX and was introduced in England by Cardinal Otho during the reign of Henry III.
See LEVY, supra note 2, at 46. One of Cardinal Otho's decrees (called constitutions)
provided that "the oath of calumny to tell the truth in ecclesiastical causes, in order that
truth may be more easily uncovered and causes more speedily finished, shall henceforth
be administered throughout the realm of England ... ." Id.
24. See id. at 46-47. This process was unfair for many reasons. See id. at 47. First,
the accused was required to give the statement without knowing the nature of the charges
to be filed against him. See id. Second, the accused was not given any indication of who
his accusers were or what evidence they had against him. See id. A court could institute
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purpose behind the practice was to elicit a confession from the
defendant. If the defendant refused to take the oath, the court had the
power to coerce the accused into taking the oath by threatening
contempt of court, conviction, or even torture.26 This overwhelming
power given to the ecclesiastical courts resulted in significant
opposition, particularly from the Puritans, who viewed this practice as
an effort to identify religious dissenters and to suppress their
activities. 27 As a result of this opposition, statutes were enacted that
abolished the oath in ecclesiastical courts.'
Despite its abolition in the ecclesiastical courts, the common law
courts continued to use the oath in criminal proceedings.29 However,
powerful opposition to the oath continued.30 Eventually, near the end
of the seventeenth century, defendants simply began refusing to take
the oath, claiming that "no man is bound to incriminate himself on any
charge ... in any court."'" Progressively, the common law courts
upheld such claims, giving birth to the privilege against selfthe proceeding on its own motion and play the role of accuser, prosecutor, judge, and
jury. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 5-6. Often, rumor or suspicion were sufficient
grounds for the institution of the proceeding. See id.
25. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 46-47. According to Berger, the defendant had little
choice about whether to take the oath. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 6. He was
condemned if he refused to take the oath, and condemned if he took the oath. Id. "In the
hands of a skillful interrogator, the inquisitorial proceeding and oath were extremely
powerful tools and nearly foolproof in securing the conviction of those against whom
they were directed." Id.
26. See Lisa Tarallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination: The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End Its
Silence on the Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27
NEW ENG. L. REV. 137, 139 (1992) (citing BERGER, supra note 23, at 25). Those who
refused to take the oath were often condemned to be "whipped and pilloried." ERWIN
GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 3 (1955).
27. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 11.
28. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2250, at 284. Parliament passed a bill in 1641
prohibiting the use of the oath ex officio as an ecclesiastical procedure. See id. at 28384. Parliament addressed this issue largely because of the case of "Freeborn John"
Lilburn. See GRISWOLD, supra note 26, at 3. Lilburn was arrested and charged with
publishing heretical and seditious books. See id. He refused to take the oath and was
"whipped and pilloried." Id. The House of Commons eventually vacated his sentence.
See id. This statutory abolition followed many years of attempts by the common law
courts to restrict the inquisitorial process. See FRED E. INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION:
WHAT CAN AN ACCUSED PERSON BE COMPELLED To Do 4 (1950). It is interesting and
disturbing to note that the reason behind the common law courts' resistance to the
practice of administering the oath ex officio was not concern for the abhorrent practices
inherent in the inquisitorial process, but rather concern for the increasing power of the
ecclesiastical courts. See id.
29. See INBAU, supra note 28, at 4.
30. See id.
3 1. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2250, at 289.
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incrimination, which holds that no individual should be compelled to
give self-incriminating testimony.32
B. Adoption of the Privilege in the United States
Due to the influence of the English legal system on the colonies,
some courts in the colonies originally administered the oath ex
officio. 33 However, opposition to the practice in the colonies was
strong.34 During the ratification process of the United States
Constitution, the Bill of Rights was drafted to protect the citizens from
potential abuse of power and oppression by the national government. 35
James Madison drafted the first proposed version of the privilege
against self-incrimination, which stated that no person "shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. ' '36 This self-incrimination
clause was incorporated into the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which provides that "no person shall ... be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself., 37 This privilege
has evolved significantly, as courts have protected and interpreted this
important constitutional right.'
32. See id. at 290.
33. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 21. Note, however, that the influence of the
English use of the oath ex officio was inconsistent among the colonies. See id. Those
colonies formed by persons who had suffered in England as a result of the oath ex officio
refused to establish the practice and recognized the right against self-incrimination. See
id. Other colonies, formed under a religious belief system, established the practice,
however, as a means of suppressing differing religious beliefs. See id.
34. See id. Gradually, the belief that an individual had a right not to incriminate
himself gained widespread acceptance. See id.
35. See id. at 22. The colonists expressed concern that, without the right not to
incriminate oneself, the federal government could not insure the protection of
individuals from the "evils that lurk[ed] in the shadows of a new and untried
sovereignty." R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 789 (1935).
36. BERGER, supra note 23, at 22-23 (citing VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 58
(1776)).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V. By this time, the right to remain silent had been included
in almost every state constitution. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 22. As written, the
privilege would have been applicable in both criminal and civil proceedings. See id.
The first House of Representatives amended the provision, making it applicable only in
criminal matters. See id.
38. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam) (stating that a State
does not violate due process by permitting cross-examination as to post-arrest silence
when the defendant chooses to take the stand); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231
(1980) (holding that pre-arrest silence may be used to impeach a criminal defendant's
credibility); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (barring the use of post-arrest silence
to impeach a criminal defendant when Miranda warnings had not been administered);
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (ruling that silence following arrest and the
delivery of Miranda warnings is ambiguous and overly prejudicial and invalid for
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C. Policy Reasons Behind the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
Courts and commentators have postulated several policy reasons
supporting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.39
One of the most widely accepted policies behind the application of the
privilege is preventing individuals from being subjected to the "cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. ' 40 This policy
recognizes that it is "inherently cruel to make a man an instrument in
his own condemnation.' ' 4' Furthermore, the policy plays a role in
protecting the accusatorial nature of the United States' criminal justice
system.42 The privilege helps to ensure that the prosecution bears the
burden of proof in a criminal prosecution and that "a fair stateindividual balance" is preserved. 43 To this end, the privilege is
intended to guarantee that "the government seeking to punish an
impeachment purposes); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (holding that
the government may compel a witness to testify by conferring immunity from the use of
compelled testimony in subsequent criminal prosecutions); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (barring the prosecution's use of any statement stemming from
questioning by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody unless the
prosecution demonstrates that the person's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination was secured); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that a
prosecutor's statement of defendant's failure to testify as to matters that he can
reasonably be expected to deny or explain is evidence of guilt violates the Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Raffel, 271 U.S. 494 (1926) (finding that voluntary
testimony waives the Fifth Amendment privilege).
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was made applicable to the
states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Malloy Court held that the Fifth
Amendment was binding upon the states because, "the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed the petitioner the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination." Id. at 3.
39. See Mary A. Shein, Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under
Seige: Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK L. REV. 503, 508-11 (1993). Shein offers the
following policy reasons for the privilege: (I) preventing individuals from being
subject to either self-accusation, perjury, or contempt; (2) preserving the accusing
nature of the criminal justice system; (3) preventing abuse by government officials; and
4) protecting an individual's privacy. See id. at 509-11.
40. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (holding that the privilege protects individuals from
both legal compulsion and the "informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement
officials during in-custody questioning").
41. David Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor
Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 89, 95 (1965). See also GRISWOLD, supra note
26, at 7. "[W]e do not make even the hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or
dig his own grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have
through the course of history developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and
intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being." Id.
42. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
43. Id. The drafters of the Constitution recognized that the Bill of Rights was
necessary to protect individuals from excessive government power. See BERGER, supra
note 23, at 226.
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individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from
his own mouth." 44 The privilege also helps to limit the government's
power in criminal prosecutions.45 If the prosecution were allowed to
force defendants to incriminate themselves and then use the
information to aid in obtaining a conviction, defendants would have
little with which to protect themselves from the power of the
government over the administration of the criminal justice system.'
Another reason advanced in support of the privilege against selfincrimination is that it helps prevent physical and psychological abuse
by government officials. 4 7 Some argue that without the privilege's
protection, the government could use highly coercive techniques to
gain evidence against the defendant. 4 Moreover, some commentators
have expressed a fear that, without the privilege, criminal law in the
United States could revert back to the primitive and oppressive oath ex
officio procedure which existed in England and in some of the original
colonies.4 9 Finally, the privilege reflects society's "respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and the right of each individual
'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."'"

44. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)). "[Olur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors ...." Id.
45. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 40-41 ("[W]ithout [the privilege against selfincrimination], and in light of the state's extensive investigatory power and vast array
of criminal prohibitions, the result would be a grant of too much authority to control the
individual and too little power to prevent excesses.").
46. See id. at 39-41. See also Shein, supra note 39, at 510 (arguing that the right
against self-incrimination is one of the few limitations imposed upon the government
in its administration of the criminal justice system).
47. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. See also LEVY, supra note 2, at 326-27 (stating that
the privilege against self-incrimination developed concomitantly with the desire to
eliminate torture as a government practice in interrogations).
48. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 35 ("Compelled self-incrimination, if tolerated,
might well prove to be too tempting a tool for use against minority views.").
49. See id. For an explanation of the oath ex officio procedure, see supra Part II.A.
The oath ex officio procedure was often administered during a time when the rack, the
pillory, beatings, and whippings were common forms of torture. See LEVY, supra note
2, at 326-27. Often, actual torture was not necessary to elicit a confession, only the
threat of torture. See id.
50. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 58182 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
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D. Development of the ConstitutionalDoctrine in the Courts
Little evidence exists about the intention of the drafters of the
Constitution in their wording of the Fifth Amendment.5 ' Despite this
lack of legislative history, the Supreme Court has never
comprehensively interpreted the language of the Fifth Amendment and
has never stated outright what it thought the drafters intended the
Amendment to mean. 52 Rather, the Court has expanded the meaning
of the words one step at a time, case by case.53 This lack of concrete
interpretation has deprived the lower courts of the guidance and
substantive principles needed to apply the Fifth Amendment privilege
to cases of first impression.' Modem courts have been left to fend for
themselves, and have extended the scope of the privilege far beyond
the literal meaning of the words. 55 For example, nowhere in the Fifth
Amendment does one find the words "the right to remain silent," "the
right to have counsel present," or "anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court; ' ' 56 yet, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the privilege as containing these rights.'
The Supreme Court has established three basic legal principles in the
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. First, an invocation of the privilege against selfincrimination must be given a liberal construction. 8 Second, the
5 1. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2252, at 324.
52. See generally BERGER, supra note 23, at 50-55 (discussing differing views of the
Fifth Amendment, as well as the Supreme Court case regarding the privilege against selfincrimination).
53. See id.
54. See Tarallo, supra note 26, at 138-39.
55. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 49-50. If the privilege were interpreted narrowly,
it would merely prohibit the prosecution from compelling the defendant to take the stand
at his own criminal proceeding. See id. at 50. Giving the privilege this narrow
interpretation would have resulted in redundancy, however, because most jurisdictions
already barred a defendant from testifying at his own trial. See id. The rationale behind
disallowing a defendant from testifying on his own behalf was that his testimony would
be too biased and unreliable. See id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
57. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966).
58. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). According to the Court
in Hoffman, the privilege was added to the Bill of Rights in the belief that "'too high a
price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and that, in
its attainment, other social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed.'" Id.
(quoting Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944)). Further, in Counselman
v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that liberal construction is necessary to protect
the right the Fifth Amendment was intended to secure. See 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892),
overruled in part by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455 (1972) (reasoning that
although the holding of Counselman is sound, the broad language in Counselman is
not binding authority because it derives from an analysis of a statute that was held
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invocation of the privilege is not dependent upon the defendant's
choice of words.5 9 In other words, the defendant need not use any
special or magic combination of words to invoke the privilege."
Third, the privilege may be used by suspects who are merely being
questioned during the investigation of a crime, as well as by those in
custody, or by those already charged with a crime.6 ' According to the
Supreme Court in Kastigarv. United States,62 the right to remain silent
"can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory ... ."63 Thus, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the privilege against self-incrimination to include
both the right to refrain from answering questions during a custodial
interrogation and the right to refuse to take the stand in a criminal
trial .'
In 1966, the Supreme Court further clarified and interpreted the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in Miranda v.
Arizona.65 The Miranda Court clarified that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination provided to an accused person the
right to refuse to answer questions and to remain silent when being
interrogated during the investigation of a crime. 66 Specifically, the
"insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of evidence derived from compelled
testimony"). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit stated that "even the most feeble attempt to
claim a Fifth Amendment privilege must be recognized ...." United States v. Goodwin,
470 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1972).
59. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955). "[No] magic language or
ritualistic formula is required to assert the [Fifth Amendment] privilege [against selfincrimination] which is effectively invoked by any language which the court should
reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to claim the privilege." State v.
Bell, 298 A.2d 753, 756 (N.H. 1972) (Kenison, C.J.) (citing Quinn, 349 U.S. at 163).
Furthermore, in determining whether the privilege has been invoked, the "entire context
in which the claimant spoke must be considered." Goodwin, 470 F.2d at 902.
60. See Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162.
61. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,444 (1972).
62. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See id.
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda case is actually four cases, consolidated for
appeal. See id. at 456-57. In each of the cases, the defendant was interrogated while in
the custody of police in an isolated room. See id. at 445. None of the defendants was
given a full warning of his rights before the questioning. See id. In each of the four
cases, the defendants gave either an oral admission or a signed statement of confession,
which was used against them at trial. See id.
66 See id. at 444. The Miranda case was decided in response to the decision in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440. In Escobedo, the
defendant was taken into custody and was interrogated by police in an effort to extract a
confession. See id. at 440. The police did not tell the defendant he had a right to remain
silent or that he had a right to an attorney. See id. The defendant was questioned for four
hours, while handcuffed and standing, until he confessed. See id. During this
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Court held that the prosecution could not use statements obtained
during a custodial interrogation unless it demonstrated that certain
procedural safeguards were present during the questioning. 6
Among the procedural safeguards described in Miranda are the
requirements that prior to any interrogation, the accused must be
informed that he has a right to remain silent,6 that anything he says
may be used as evidence against him in court, 69 and that he has the
right to be represented by an attorney. 0 If at any point during the
interrogation, the police refused the defendant's requests to speak to his attorney and
disallowed the defendant's retained attorney, who was waiting at the police station, from
consulting with the defendant. See id. The Escobedo court affirmed the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse to be compelled to incriminate himself and his right to
be represented by an attorney and disallowed the defendant's confession. See id. at 442.
The Escobedo decision remained silent, however, on the issue of whether a defendant
must be informed of these rights before questioning. See id.
67. See id. at 436. The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. The Court
discussed at length some of the reasons for the procedural safeguards it imposed,
including the history of physical brutality in custodial interrogations. See id. at 44446. The Court pointed out that in the past, the police often resorted to beatings,
hangings, whippings, and other violence during interrogation in order to extract
confessions from the accused. See id. The Court cited a case decided only a year prior to
Miranda in which the police brutally beat, kicked, and placed lighted cigarette butts on
the back of a potential witness during interrogation. See id. at 446 (citing People v.
Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1965)). The Court also expressed concern over the
mentally coercive nature of in-custody interrogations. See id. at 461. The court asserted
that "fain individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak." Id. In order to demonstrate the
inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogations, the Court gave several examples
of interrogation techniques explained in an actual police manual. See id. at 452-55. The
manual advises the interrogator to be alone with the defendant and cut him off from any
outside support. See id. at 455. Further, an interrogator should have an "aura of
confidence" in the defendant's guilt in order to undermine the defendant's will. Id. The
manual advises relentless questioning. See id. Finally, the manual suggests that if
normal procedures fail to extract a confession, the police should resort to deceptive
techniques such as giving false legal advice and tricking the defendant out of exercising
his constitutional rights. See id.
68. See id. at 467-68. The Court stated that this warning is necessary to inform
defendants who are not aware of the privilege. See id. at 468. Further, this warning is
needed to overcome the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. See id.
69. See id. at 469. The Court explained that this warning is necessary because
without an understanding of this concept, a defendant cannot have a "real understanding
and intelligent exercise" of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id.
70. See id. at 471. A defendant has a right to consult with an attorney before
questioning and to have the lawyer present during questioning. See id. The fact that a
defendant does not ask for an attorney before questioning does not constitute a waiver of
this right. See id. at 470. The Court pointed out that the individual who does not ask for
an attorney before interrogation may be the person who most needs the assistance of an
attorney. See id. at 470-71. The accused may waive any of these rights, as long as the
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custodial interrogation, the accused indicates that he wishes to remain
silent, the police must cease questioning him. 7' The Court emphasized
that simply because the individual answers some questions or offers
information to the police does not deprive him of the right to suspend
answering questions or speaking with the authorities at any time until
consulting with an attorney. 72
The Court in Miranda stated that these procedural safeguards are
necessary to allow an accused a full opportunity to exercise his
privilege against self-incrimination.73 The Court concluded that
without these safeguards, the custodial interrogation process contains
inherently coercive pressures which serve to weaken the accused's
ability to resist, and to force the accused to speak against his free
will. 74 In order to protect the accused in this process, the Court stated
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is necessary, can be used outside
of criminal court proceedings, and "serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. 75 This
statement implies that the Miranda requirements are not limited to the
setting of a custodial interrogation; they may be extended to a noncustodial, pre-arrest situation, if the situation involves the possibility
"waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 444. A heavy burden
rests with the government to prove that the defendant made a valid waiver of these
rights. See id. at 475 (citing Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490 n.14).
71. See id. at 473-74. This silence constituted the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See id. at 474. The Court stated that any statement made after the
privilege is invoked must be the product of compulsion. See id.
72. See id. at 445. Furthermore, if the accused communicates at any stage that he
wishes to speak to an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
See id. at 474. At this point, the defendant must have the opportunity to consult with
his attorney and to have an attorney present for any additional questioning. See id.
73. See id. at 444.
74. See id. at 467. In his dissent, however, Justice White stated that the test to
determine whether an interrogation was coercive or not has been to consider whether the
"totality of circumstances deprived the defendant of a 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer,' and whether physical or psychological coercion was of such a degree
that 'the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed."' Id. at 534 (White,
J., dissenting) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963)).
75. Id. at 467. Justice Harlan disagreed in his dissent. See id. at 504 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan stated, "I believe the decision of the Court represents poor
constitutional law and entails harmful consequences for the country at large. How
serious these consequences may prove to be only time can tell. But the basic flaws in
the Court's justification seem to me readily apparent now once all sides of the problem
are considered." Id. (Harlan, J.,dissenting). Justice Harlan continued, "the Court
portrays the evils of normal police questioning in terms which I think are exaggerated."
Id. at 517 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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of self-incrimination. 76
E. Prosecution'sUse of Defendant's Silence
Although the Miranda decision established that an accused has the
right to remain silent, it did not address whether the prosecution may
use such silence to imply that the defendant is guilty. 77 While the
Court has never explicitly decided whether pre-arrest silence may be
used to imply guilt, it has ruled that pre-arrest silence may be used to
impeach a defendant's testimony.' However, the Court has also held
that the prosecution may not use post-arrest silence or the defendant's
failure to take the stand to imply guilt.79
1. Pre-Arrest Silence
The Supreme Court has never decided whether the prosecution may
use a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence in its case-in-chief to
imply guilt.' ° The Court held in Jenkins v. Anderson,8' however, that
a prosecutor may use pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's
credibility if he takes the stand in his defense.82 The logic behind
admitting such evidence is that the silence amounts to a prior
inconsistent statement. 83 In Jenkins, the defendant was charged with
murder.' 4 The defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim, but
claimed he had acted solely in self-defense and took the stand to assert
this defense. 85 The prosecution cross-examined the defendant about
the defendant's failure to go to the police to explain the occurrence; the
prosecution also referred to the defendant's pre-arrest silence in its
closing argument.'
76. See id. at 467.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 65-76
78. See infra text accompanying notes 80-93.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 94-126.
80. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1996).
81. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
82. See id. at 240-41.
83. See United States v. Nabors, 707 F.2d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 1983).
84. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 232. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in
the trial court and the conviction was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. See
id. at 234.
85. See id. at 233. The defendant testified on cross-examination that he tried "[t]o
push that knife in [the victim] as far as [he] could," but insisted that he stabbed the
victim in self-defense. Id.
86. See id. at 233-34. The defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had
waited two days to tell anyone about the stabbing and waited a full two weeks to report
the incident to police. See id. at 233. The prosecutor used this testimony to impeach
the defendant's credibility. See id. at 235. The prosecutor suggested that had the killing
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On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment was
not violated by the prosecution's use of the defendant's pre-arrest
silence, because it was used to impeach the defendant's credibility.8
The Court ruled that, although the use of a defendant's silence by a
prosecutor is improper when the defendant asserts the right to remain
silent during trial, use of pre-arrest silence is proper to impeach the
defendant when he testifies in his own defense.8 The Court based its
decision on United States v. Raffel,89 which held that the use of a
defendant's silence for impeachment purposes does not violate the
Fifth Amendment. 90 The Court recognized that a person facing arrest
will be afraid to remain silent if his silence can later be used to impeach
him,9' but stated that when the defendant decides to speak, it opens the
door to such use by "cast[ing] aside his cloak of silence and
advanc[ing] the truthfinding function of the criminal trial. 92 The
Court expressly noted that it did "not consider whether or under what
circumstances pre-arrest silence may be protected by the Fifth
Amendment."'
truly been in self-defense, the defendant would not have waited so long to tell his story
to police. See id. The defendant argued on appeal that the prosecutor's comments
violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and that the Fifth Amendment
prohibits comments on silence. See id.
87. See id. at 238. The Court recognized that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
prohibits the use of silence for impeachment purposes if the silence comes after the
Miranda warnings have been given. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40. The Court
reasoned that the unfairness resulting from the use of silence for impeachment purposes
in Doyle did not exist in Jenkins because the government did not induce the defendant in
Jenkins to remain silent by reading him his Miranda rights. See id. at 240.
88. See id. at 235.
89. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
90. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235 (citing Raffel, 271 U.S. at 495). In Raffel, the
defendant was tried twice for the same crime. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 495. He chose not to
take the stand at his first trial. See id. At his second trial, Raffel took the stand to deny
making a statement attributed to him, and cross-examination revealed that he had not
testified at his first trial. See id. The Raffel Court held that the questions concerning
prior silence were permissible because the defendant could be cross-examined like any
other witness when he took the stand in his own defense. See id. at 496-97. "The
immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering
himself as a witness." Id.
9 1. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236. Despite the Court's recognition of a person's fear
when faced with arrest, it explained that "the Constitution does not forbid 'every
government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging
the exercise of constitutional rights."' Id. (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S.
17, 30 (1973)).
92. Id. at 238. The Court pointed out that the defendant can always decide not to take
the stand in his own defense in order to avoid cross-examination if he does not want his
silence to be used against him. See id.
93. Id. at 236 n.2. The court stated that it need not reach the issue of whether and
when pre-arrest silence is protected by the Fifth Amendment because the Raffel decision
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2. Post-Arrest, Pre-MirandaSilence
The Supreme Court has also ruled that the prosecution may use a
defendant's silence for impeachment purposes if the silence occurs
after arrest but before Miranda warnings. 94 In Fletcherv. Weir,95 the
Court held that if the defendant is not given the affirmative assurances
contained in the Miranda warnings before the silence and takes the
stand in his own defense, the Fifth Amendment is not violated if the
State cross-examines the defendant concerning such silence.96 The
Court reasoned that the Miranda warnings induce silence by implicitly
assuring the defendant that his silence will not be used against him. 97
In the absence of these assurances, the Court ruled that unfairness
does not result from the use of silence to impeach the defendant's
credibility. 98
While the Jenkins and Fletcher decisions taken together establish
that pre-arrest silence, and post-arrest, but pre-Miranda silence, may
be utilized to impeach a defendant's credibility if he takes the stand in
his own defense, they do not address the issue of whether such
evidence may be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief to imply that
the defendant is guilty. 99 As with pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, the
Court has never decided whether post-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence may
be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief to imply the defendant's
guilt.
3. Post-Arrest, Post-MirandaSilence
Although the Court has held that the prosecution may use a
defendant's pre-arrest silence and post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to

"clearly permits impeachment" by use of pre-arrest silence. Id.
94. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam). The defendant in
Fletcher was charged with the murder of Ronnie Buchanan. See id. at 603. Buchanan
allegedly pinned Weir to the ground in a fight in a nightclub parking lot. See id. During
the fight, Weir stabbed Buchanan. See id. Buchanan later died from the stab wounds.
See id. Weir left the scene immediately and did not report the altercation to police. See
id. At trial, the defendant admitted that he had stabbed the victim, but asserted that he
had acted in self-defense. See id. This testimony was the first time the defendant had
told anyone that he had acted in self-defense, so the prosecutor cross-examined him as to
why he had not offered this story to police. See id. at 603-04. The defendant was
eventually convicted of first-degree manslaughter. See id.
95. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
96. See id. at 607.
97. See id. at 605-06. The Court stated that the mere arrest of a defendant was not
government action that induced a defendant to remain silent. See id.
98. See id. at 607.
99. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 603.
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impeach a defendant,"°° the Court has held that the prosecution may
not use a defendant's silence to impeach if it occurs after arrest and
Miranda warnings.1"" The Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio 1 °2
that prosecutorial use of post-arrest, post-Mirandasilence to impeach a
defendant's credibility violated the defendant's constitutional rights."
The Doyle court stated that because of the nature of Miranda warnings,
it would be a violation of due process to allow comment on the silence
that Miranda warnings may have encouraged.'" Although Miranda
warnings do not contain an express assurance that silence will carry no
penalty, the warnings imply such an assurance to a person receiving
the warnings.' °5 The Court also reasoned that a defendant's postarrest silence, being "insolubly ambiguous," has low probative
value.' O6 For these reasons, the Court concluded that it would be
"fundamentally unfair" and a "deprivation of due process" to allow
post-Mirandasilence to be used to impeach a defendant's subsequent

100. See supra Parts II.E.1-2.
101. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); see also United States v. Hale, 422
U.S. 171 (1975). The Court in Jenkins distinguished Doyle by reasoning that the
unfairness resulting from the use of silence to impeach in Doyle did not exist in Jenkins
because the government did not induce the defendant in Jenkins to remain silent by
reading the defendant his Miranda rights. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
102. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
103. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611. The defendant was arrested and charged with selling
ten pounds of marijuana to a police informant. See id. at 611. The defendant was in
possession of $1320 at the time of his arrest. See id. At trial, the defendant claimed that
he had been framed by the informant. See id. at 613. He claimed that the arrangement
had been for the defendant to buy the ten pounds of marijuana. See id. He testified that
the informant grew angry, took his ten pounds of marijuana back and threw the $1320
into the truck for no apparent reason. See id. The prosecution tried to impeach this
story by questioning the defendant about the fact that he did not tell this story to police.
See id.
104. See id. at 618. "Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more
than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights." Id. at 619. Thus, the defendant's
silence in this situation is "insolubly ambiguous." Id. at 617.
105. See id. at 618. The Court felt Justice White's comment in Hale was
representative of its position:
[Wlhen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that he may
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he may
have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not comport with due
process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his
silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about
the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable
inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony ....
Id. at 619 (quoting Hale, 422 U.S. at 183 (White, J., concurring)).
106. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 n.8. The Court recognized that silence may be
ambiguous entirely apart from the Miranda warnings because there may be several
innocent explanations for the silence. See id. (citing Hale, 422 U.S. at 177).
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explanation at trial."°
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Hale'08 that
post-arrest silence could not be used by the prosecution to impeach a
defendant's testimony at trial.' 0 9 However, the Hale Court's
reasoning differed from that of the Doyle Court."' Justice Marshall
wrote that such evidence should be excluded because the probative
value of post-arrest silence is very low and the prejudicial effect is very
high."' Even after the Doyle and Hale decisions, however, postarrest silence may be used to impeach a defendant who testifies to a
and claims to have told the police the same
version of the events
12
version after arrest.
While Doyle bars use of a defendant's silence to impeach if the
silence occurs after Miranda warnings have been given, it does not
address the issue of whether the prosecution may use silence to
impeach if the silence occurs before Miranda warnings or arrest." 3
Some circuit court decisions have held that a prosecutor may not
comment on a defendant's silence if it occurs after arrest but before the
107. See id. at 618. The Court ordered that the defendant's conviction be reversed and
the cause be remanded to the state court. See id. at 620.
108. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
109. See id. The defendant in Hale was arrested for robbery. See id. at 171. When
asked post-Miranda why he had a significant amount of cash on his person shortly after
the robbery, the defendant remained silent. See id. At trial, the defendant claimed that
his wife had received her welfare check the day of the robbery and had given the
defendant cash to purchase money orders for her. See id. at 174. The prosecution used
the defendant's silence after arrest to attempt to impeach this explanation. See id.
110. See id. at 180. The Court's reasoning for disallowing the use of post-arrest
silence was not the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but rather the
belief that the probative value of the evidence was low and its prejudicial effect was
high. See id. The Court did not discuss whether the probative value of silence occurring
before arrest was also low.
11l. See id. Justice Marshall, writing the opinion for the Court, stated, "In most
circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force." Id. at 176.
Marshall also wrote that reference to post-arrest silence carries with it a "significant
potential for prejudice. The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight
to the defendant's previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant to
explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative inference
that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent at the time
of his arrest." Id. at 180.
112. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.ll.
It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used
by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory
version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon
arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach
the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to
his behavior following arrest.
Id. (citing United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1975)).
113. Seeid. at610.
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Mirandawarnings have been given." 4 Other decisions in the Supreme
Court have distinguished Doyle by pointing out that the silence in
Doyle came after Miranda warnings and that the Miranda warnings
contain an implicit assurance that the defendant's silence will not be
used against him." 5 These decisions argue that this assurance is not
present if the Miranda warnings have not been given." 6
4. Silence on the Witness Stand/Refusal to Testify
In addition to holding that the prosecution may not use a defendant's
post-arrest silence to imply guilt, the Supreme Court has also held that
the prosecution may not use a defendant's silence at trial to imply
guilt." 7 In Griffin v. California,"8 the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment forbids the prosecution in a criminal case from
commenting on the defendant's failure to testify at trial and from using
such silence as evidence of the defendant's guilt." 9
In *Griffin,a California jury convicted the defendant of murder in the
first degree. 20 The defendant refused to testify at the trial on the issue
of guilt.' 2 ' The trial court instructed the jury that although the
defendant had a constitutional right to refuse to take the stand, the jury
could take this failure to deny or explain evidence into consideration in
determining whether such evidence was true. 22 The court further
114. See United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980); Bradford v.
Stone, 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.
1973). In United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981), the court implied
that these decisions may have to be reconsidered in the light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Jenkins v. Anderson. See supra Part II.E.I.
115. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S.
552 (1980).
116. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 404.
117. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
118. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
119. See id. The rationale for protecting the defendant's right not to be compelled to
take the stand in his own defense was explained in Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60
(1893). The Wilson Court pointed out that even an innocent defendant may be
understandably reluctant to testify in his defense. See id. The defendant may confuse the
issues and embarrass himself on the stand through nervousness, timidity, or attempting
to explain suspicious events. See id. This may increase prejudice against him rather
than remove it. See id.
120. See Griffin at 609. The defendant was sentenced to death and the California
Supreme Court upheld the conviction. See id. at 611.
121. See id. at 609. The defendant did testify at a separate trial held to decide his
sentence. See id.
122. See id. at 609-10. Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution at that
time stated, in part, "in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his
failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against
him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the
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instructed the members of the jury that they could conclude that the
more probable inferences which could be drawn based on the
defendant's failure to testify were those unfavorable to the
defendant.123 Additionally, the prosecution commented on the
defendant's failure to take the stand.' 24 The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, holding that the Fifth Amendment forbids comment by
both the prosecution and the court that a defendant's failure to testify is
evidence of guilt.'2 However, the Griffin Court did not address the
issue of whether the Fifth Amendment also prohibits prosecutorial
comments about silence which occurs in a pre-trial situation' 26
court or the jury." Id. at 610 n.2 (quoting CAL. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 13 (repealed Nov. 5,
1974)). The Court held that this provision violated the Fifth Amendment. See id. at
613. The Court recognized that forty-four states had laws prohibiting comment on the
defendant's failure to testify. See id. at 611 n.3.
123. See id. at 610. Specifically, the trial court had instructed the jury:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be
expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does
not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such
evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to
indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable.
Id. (quoting the trial court's jury instructions).
The trial court had added that the defendant's failure to explain or deny does not create a
presumption of guilt. See id. The court also stated that no inferences unfavorable to the
defendant could be drawn as to evidence regarding matters of which the defendant had no
knowledge. See id.
124. See id. at 611. The defendant had been seen with the victim the night of her
death and evidence placed him in the alley where her body was found. See id. at 610. The
prosecutor commented:
He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how the blood got
on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how long he was with her
in that box. He would know how her wig got off. He would know whether he
beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether he walked away from that
place cool as a cucumber ... because he was conscious of his own guilt and
wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman. These things he has
not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And in the whole world, if
anybody would know, this defendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she can't
tell you her side of the story. The defendant won't.
Id. at 611 (quoting the trial court prosecutor).
125. See id. at 615. In order to determine whether remarks by the prosecution or the
prosecution's witness amount to comments on the defendant's silence, in violation of
the fifth amendment, two alternative tests have been proposed. See United States v.
Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1983). First, the court may ask whether the manifest
intent of the remark is to comment on the defendant's silence. See id. at 381.
Alternatively, the court may ask if the nature of the remark is such that a jury would
"naturally and necessarily" construe the statement as a comment on the defendant's
silence. Id.
126. See Griffin, 380 U.S. 609. The Court reserved decision as to whether an accused
could require the court to instruct the jury that his silence must be disregarded. Id. at 615
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III. DISCUSSION

A. The Split Among the Circuit Courts
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
admissibility of prosecutorial comments on pre-arrest silence to imply
guilt, several of the circuit courts have been faced with the issue.
However, their treatment of the issue has been inconsistent, with some
circuits allowing such comments and some not.' 27 At least one circuit
faced with the issue for the first time was reluctant to establish a rule
due, in part, to this variation in treatment.' 28 Thus, the circuit split has
grown because of the various circuit courts' failure to establish a
uniform rule.
1. Eleventh and Fifth Circuits Allow Comments on Pre-Arrest
Silence
Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have consistently held that the Fifth
Amendment is not violated by prosecutorial comments on silence at
trial if the silence occurs before arrest.1 29 For example, in United
States v. Rivera, 31 the court held that the government may comment
on a defendant's silence before Miranda warnings in an attempt to
imply guilt without violating the Fifth Amendment. 131
In Rivera, the defendants were questioned by customs agents
32
concerning suspected drug smuggling after a flight from Columbia.'
n.26.
127. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have allowed the prosecution to comment on
pre-arrest silence. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996)
(determining that the statement in question was not about the defendant's silence, but
was instead about his "failure to connect his claimed duress to his decision to transport
drugs into the United States"); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.
1991); United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1577 (11th Cir. 1985). The First,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have not allowed the prosecution to use pre-arrest silence to
imply guilt. See United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991);
Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel.
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 2017-18 (7th Cir. 1987).
128. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1996). For a
discussion of the Thompson case, see supra Part I.
129. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568; Carter, 760 F.2d at 1577; United States v.
Nabors, 707 F.2d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Riola, 694 F.2d 670,
673 (1th Cir. 1983).
130. 944 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1991).
131. See id. 1568. The court held such silence could be used by the prosecution
whether it came before or after arrest. See id.
132. See id. at 1565. The defendants were stopped by a Customs Inspector after
arriving at Miami International Airport from Columbia. See id. Due to several
suspicious circumstances surrounding the group, the Customs Inspector questioned the
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At trial, the inspector testified as to the defendants' silence and
deadpan reactions to the situation both before and after arrest and
Miranda warnings. 33 In addition, the prosecutor commented in her
closing argument that the group had been "consistently indifferent"
throughout the encounter and asked the jury to infer that this had been
a pre-arranged response among the group in case they were
apprehended." 3 The defendants contended that the use of their silence
as evidence violated their constitutional rights. 35
The Eleventh Circuit first held that the comment about the silence
that occurred after the reading of the Miranda rights raised a substantial
question as to its constitutionality, but found that any prejudice
flowing from such a violation would have been harmless error. 36 The
court reasoned that when the government has induced the defendant's
silence by assuring him that he has the right to remain silent in the
Miranda warnings, the prosecution cannot fairly use that silence
against him.1 37 The court then held that the comments about the
silence that occurred before Miranda warnings did not raise
constitutional difficulties. 38 Citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 3 9 the court
group and inspected their luggage at the airport. See id. The agent found a large amount
of cocaine hidden in false bottoms of the defendants' suitcases. See id. The agent also
found cocaine in false hairspray cans. See id. at 1566.
133. See id. at 1567. The customs agent testified that when he opened the false
bottoms of the suitcases and found the cocaine in front of the defendants, "the
[defendants] showed no surprise, agitation, or protest." Id. at 1565. The agent described
the defendants reactions as "deadpan" and testified that "[niothing verbal was said." Id.
at 1567 n.9.
134. Id. at 1567.
135. See id. The defendants argued that the agent's testimony and the prosecutor's
comments were a direct comment on their silence. See id. at 1568. The government
claimed, however, that the prosecutor did not "comment on the defendants' silence, but
only on their mannerisms and demeanor." Id. The court cited United States v. Elkins,
774 F.2d 530, 537 (1st Cir. 1985), for the proposition that comments on silence also
occur when the prosecution's references to silence are more oblique than simply a direct
statement that the defendant failed to answer questions. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568
n.13.
136. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1569. The court discussed the difficulty of drawing a
distinction between comments that the defendant is "being silent" and that the defendant
is "acting silent." Id. at 1568. The court recognized that to accept the government's
position that the prosecution's comments were not comments on silence might put
future defendants in the position of having to express their innocence nonverbally
through "flailing arms [and] shaking heads" to prevent the government from drawing
negative inferences from a defendant's passive silence. Id. at 1569. Ultimately, the
court avoided deciding this issue, holding that any prejudice resulting from the
comments was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 1570.
137. See id. at 1567.
138. See id.
139. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 81-93 for a
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stated that the government may comment on a defendant's silence if it
occurs before he is arrested and given Miranda warnings. 4 '
Additionally, the court cited Fletcher v. Weir 4' for the proposition that
the government may also comment on silence if it occurs after arrest
but before Miranda rights. 42 The Rivera court failed to point out,
however, that the silence in Jenkins and Fletcher was used for
impeachment purposes, whereas silence was used to imply guilt in
Rivera.143 Thus, the only comments on silence which are
impermissible in the Eleventh Circuit are comments on silence
occurring after Miranda warnings have been given.
The rationale the Rivera court used in allowing comments on a
defendant's silence before arrest was followed in United States v.
Simon.' 44 In Simon, a police officer was involved in an armed
robbery and murder and repeatedly refused to produce his firearm to
the government for ballistics testing, asserting his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 145 At trial, the prosecution
commented several times in their closing argument on the defendant's
failure to produce the gun in order to prove his guilt."4 In holding that
discussion of Jenkins.
140. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568. The prosecutor in Rivera used the defendant's
silence before arrest to imply that the defendant was guilty, not for impeachment
purposes. Id. In Jenkins, silence was used for impeachment purposes. Jenkins, 447
U.S. at 235.
141. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). See supra text accompanying notes 95-98
for a discussion of Fletcher.
142. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568. The court stated that the vital distinction as to
whether comments on silence are admissible is whether Miranda warnings have been
given. See id. Thus, whether the defendant has been taken into custody or arrested did
not matter to the court unless the defendant was given some kind of assurance that his
silence will not be used against him. See id.
143. See id. at 1568. The Jenkins and Fletcher decisions did not extend their
holdings to allow the use of pre-arrest silence to imply guilt. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at
235; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 609. The holdings were specifically limited to the use of
silence for impeachment purposes. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at
609.
144. 964 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1992).
145. See id. at 1085. The defendant, although he was a police officer, was involved
in a scheme to rob a drug dealer. See id. at 1083. The officer-defendant did not find drugs
or money at the drug dealer's home. See id. The defendant did not want to leave behind
any witnesses so he killed the drug dealer and his girlfriend. See id. The defendant shot
both victims eight or nine times with his .22 caliber pistol, but they were still
screaming and moving, so he shot them in the back of the head with a .45 caliber pistol.
See id. After the shooting, the defendant changed his bloody clothes in his car and met
his wife and son for a movie. See id.
146. See id. at 1085. The prosecution attempted to use this silence to show that the
defendant had something to hide. See id. Although the failure to produce a gun is not
silence in the traditional sense of the word, the court said they would treat the failure as if
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the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege was not violated by the
prosecution's comments because he had not yet received his Miranda
warnings, the court stated that use of a defendant's silence or failure to
act is admissible as evidence of guilt in the absence of Miranda
warnings.147
Similarly, in United States v. Carter, 8 the Eleventh Circuit again
held that, in certain circumstances, the prosecution may permissibly
comment on a defendant's pre-arrest silence. 49 At trial, a customs
agent testified that when asked a question, one of the defendants stated
that he wanted to speak with an attorney.' 5 The Carter court first
recognized that such silence can be used to impeach a defendant's own
testimony, citing Jenkins v. Anderson.'5 ' The court went on to hold,
however, that it was not reversible error for a prosecution witness to
testify that during pre-arrest questioning, the defendant stopped
answering questions and asked to speak to a lawyer. 52 Accordingly,
the court held that this testimony in no way violated the defendant's
constitutional right to remain silent.'"
it were verbal silence because the failure was covered by the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. See id. at 1086.
147. See id. The court cited United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (1 1th Cir. 1991),
for this proposition. See id. at 1086.
148. 760 F.2d 1568 (1lth Cir. 1985).
149. See id. at 1577. Customs officers detected a suspicious aircraft heading for
Florida. See id. at 1571. They pursued the plane to a secluded grassy airstrip in southern
Florida, but the passengers had fled. See id. Officials found traces of marijuana in the
plane. See id. Several persons were eventually apprehended, including defendant
Sheehy. See id. at 1574.
150. See id. Sheehy's passport was found in the airplane. See id. When asked why
his passport was found in the plane, Sheehy replied that he wanted to speak to an
attorney. See id.
151. See id. (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)). The court stated
that prejudice was limited since the statement came before arrest. See id. Further, the
court reasoned that the agent's statement was simply intended to show how and why the
conversation between the agent and Sheehy ended. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. The court also held that the trial court did not err in disallowing the
prosecutor's remarks concerning the defendant's refusal to testify at trial. See id. at
1578. The prosecutor stated in his closing argument, "You have heard Kevin Sheehy
testify - not testify." Id. at 1577. The court adopted a two step test from United States v.
Wilson, 500 F.2d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1974), to determine when a prosecutor's remark
constitutes an impermissible comment on a defendant' failure to take the stand. See
Carter,760 F.2d at 1578. According to the Wilson test, the court should ask whether the
"statement was manifestly intended or was of such character that a jury would naturally
and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." Id.
(citing United States v. Carrodeguas, 747 F.2d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting
United States v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1974))). Applying this test, the
Carter court held that the prosecutor's remarks were not intended to imply to the jury that
the defendant failed to testify; thus, the remarks were permissible. Id. The Cartercourt
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Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has held that
prosecutorial use of pre-arrest silence in its case-in-chief to imply guilt
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 54 In United States v.
Zanabria,'55 for example, the Fifth Circuit allowed both testimony and
comments in the prosecution's closing argument concerning the
defendant's silence prior to arrest.'5 At trial, the defendant asserted as
a defense the explanation that his actions were the result of duress. 57
The prosecution used the defendant's failure to tell this story to the
police before arrest to impeach the duress defense."5
Although the pre-arrest silence was used in this case to impeach the
defendant's duress defense and not to imply his guilt, the court did not
conclude that the comments were admissible based on the fact that they
were used to impeach the defendant's defense. 159 Instead, the court
relied on the theory that the Fifth Amendment protects only against
self-incrimination when compelled by the government.' 6° Thus, the
Zanabria holding could be extended to allow any comment on prearrest silence, whether used to impeach or to imply the defendant's
guilt.
did not discuss the possibility of using this test to determine whether prosecutorial
comments on pre-arrest silence are permissible. Id. at 1577. The court also did not
explain why this rule does not conflict with the decision in Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965). See id. at 148 (discussing prosecutorial comments). For a discussion
of Griffin, see supra Part II.E.4.
154. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
155. 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
156. See id. at 593. In Zanabria, the police arrested the defendant after they found
nearly three kilos of cocaine in his suitcase during a customs search at Houston
Intercontinental Airport. See id. at 592. The police charged the defendant with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and unlawful importation. See id.
157. See id. Zanabria, claiming that he was in financial trouble, had resorted to
borrowing money from a loanshark. See id. Zanabria received death threats against his
eight-year-old daughter if he did not pay off his debt. See id. The defendant did not take
the stand, but his wife testified that he resorted to illegal activity in order to pay off
these debts. See id.
158. See id. The arresting customs officer testified that prior to his arrest, the
defendant did not say anything about the threats against his daughter or his financial
problems. See id. at 593.
159. The Zanabria court did not even cite Jenkins, which seemed to be closely on
point. Jenkins held that the government can use the defendant's pre-arrest silence to
impeach the defendant's defense. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980). The
only difference between Jenkins and Zanabria is that the defendant did not take the stand
in Zanabria. Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 592. Nonetheless, the court did not follow the
reasoning in Jenkins and, instead, based its decision on the proposition that the
defendant's silence was not compelled by the government and was therefore not
protected from comment by the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 593. See supra Part II.E. 1,
for a discussion of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
160. See Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593.
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2. Circuits Not Allowing Comments
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the
prosecution from using a defendant's pre-arrest silence to imply
guilt. 6' However, the Seventh Circuit has subsequently held that
comment on pre-arrest silence is permissible when a defendant
selectively answers an investigator's questions. 62 Therefore, when
this Seventh Circuit decision is combined with the decisions in the
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits allowing comment on pre-arrest silence in
any circumstance,' 63 and the decisions in the First and Tenth Circuits
disallowing comment on pre-arrest silence,"6 three distinct rules stand
regarding the use of pre-arrest silence.
a. First Circuit
In Coppola v. Powell,165 the First Circuit held that a defendant's
pre-arrest statement refusing confession was not admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.' 6 At trial, the trooper who questioned the
defendant testified as to the defendant's statement that he would not
confess. 67 The trial court allowed the admission of this testimony and
the defendant was convicted.'" Although the testimony in question
concerned an affirmative statement by the defendant that he would not
confess, rather than silence, the court of appeals ruled that the case
should be treated the same as a case in which the prosecution has
commented on the defendant's pre-arrest silence because both
161. See infra Part III.A.2.
162. See United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that once the defendants gave an officer their version of events in a noncustodial, voluntary interview, they forfeited their Fifth Amendment privilege). For a
detailed discussion of Davenport, see infra text accompanying notes 199-210.
163. See supra Part III.A. 1.
164. See supra Part III.A.2.
165. 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989).
166. See id. at 1568. The defendant in Coppola was charged with rape and burglary.
See id. at 1563. On the day of the crime, state and local police officers went to his
residence to question him about the rape. See id. One of the officers asked the defendant
if he would be willing to talk. See id. The defendant replied that he would not confess.
See id.
167. See id. at 1564. The defendant said, "Let me tell you something. I'm not one of
your country bumpkins. I grew up on the streets of Providence, Rhode Island. And if
you think I'm going to confess to you, you're crazy." Id. The officer also testified that
when the defendant was asked if he would talk, he responded in a hostile, bragging tone
and stated that he would not talk to the officer without a lawyer. See id.
168. See id. The trial court did not allow the officer's statement that the defendant
asked for a lawyer because of the potential for a severe prejudicial effect on the jury. See
id. at 1563.
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situations involved an invocation of the privilege against selfincrimination.69
The Coppola court stated that it was unable to find any Supreme
Court cases holding, or even suggesting, that a pre-arrest invocation of
the Fifth Amendment privilege can be used by the prosecutor in his
case-in-chief.1 70 Further, the court pointed out that the decision in
Jenkins v. Anderson applies only to the use of pre-arrest silence to
impeach, and not to the use of such silence in the prosecution's casein-chief. 7 ' The court stated that the defendant intended to invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination, and relied on this Fifth
Amendment protection.' 72 The court emphasized the fact that the
defendant said that he would not confess and followed this with a
request for a lawyer.' 73 Additionally, the defendant did not later take
the stand and try to explain his actions.' 74 For these reasons, the court

held that the defendant's constitutional rights were 75violated by the use
of the statement in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
169. See id. at 1567. The court also stated that the Fifth Amendment protects the
defendant from both testimony and prosecutorial comment on pre-arrest silence. See id.
170. See id. at 1568. In its analysis, the court referred to three basic legal principles
concerning the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. For a
discussion of these three principles, see supra Part II.D.
171. See id. at 1568.
172. See id. The court held that the defendant successfully invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege before it found that the statements made by the agent were
inadmissible. See id. at 1567. The Coppolla court cited Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 444 (1972), for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment privilege "is not
limited to persons in custody or charged with a crime; it may also be asserted by a
suspect who is questioned during the investigation of a crime." Coppolla, 878 F.2d at
1565. Addressing the importance and breadth of the Fifth Amendment, the court also
quoted a former Chief Judge of the First Circuit, Magruder:
Our forefathers, when they wrote this provision into the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution, had in mind a lot of history which has been largely
forgotten to-day. [citations omitted]. They made a judgment and expressed it
in our fundamental law, that it were better for an occasional crime to go
unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a criminal case,
in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced disclosures by the accused.
Id. at 1566 (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1951)).
173. See id. at 1568.
174. See id. The court found that these facts indicated that the defendant intended to
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege. See id.
175. See id. The court undertook a lengthy analysis to determine if the failure of the
trial court to exclude the testimony of the officer was harmless error. See id. at 1569-71.
The court commented that the case was not one of overwhelming guilt and that it was not
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. See
id. at 1571. Moreover, there was no conclusive evidence that connected the defendant to
the crime. See id. For these reasons, the court concluded that the statement may have
been the clincher to the jury and held that the error was not harmless. See id.
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b. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has also disallowed prosecutorial use of a
defendant's silence prior to arrest or Miranda warnings to imply
guilt. 176 In United States v. Burson, 77 the court held that the
admission of testimony that the defendant remained silent when
questioned prior to his arrest for tax evasion constituted plain error in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 78 Investigators
testified in Burson that the defendant would not answer their
questions. 7 9 The defendant contended that the use of this testimony
as substantive evidence of his guilt was an impermissible comment on
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.18m
The court cited Griffin v. California1 ' for the proposition that once
a defendant invokes his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, at
trial, the prosecution may not refer to any circumstances surrounding
the defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights.' 82 The court
recognized that certain exceptions to this rule exist, such as in the case
of impeachment, but found that none of these exceptions applied to the
case at hand."8 Thus, the court held that the admission of the agents'
testimony was plain error and in violation of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights.'
176. See United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991).
177. 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991).
178. See id. at 1201. The defendant in Burson was charged with tax evasion. See id.
at 1198. During its case in chief, the prosecution called as witnesses two IRS agents
who testified that they went to defendant's home, prior to arrest, to question the
defendant. See id. at 1200.
179. See id. The agents were asked if the defendants ever responded to their
questions, to which they replied, "No." Id. The trial court allowed this testimony and
the defendant was convicted. See id.
180. See id.
181. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
182. See Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201. The court stated that the Griffin case prevented
the prosecution from commenting on any Fifth Amendment rights that the defendant has
exercised. See id. This statement suggests that the Burson court interpreted the Griffin
case to prohibit any comment on silence, whether it comes before arrest or on the stand.
The Griffin Court seemed to limit its holding to disallowing comment on the failure to
take the stand. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
183. See Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201.
184. See id. The court held that although the admission did constitute plain error,
this error was harmless. See id. at 1202. In making this determination, the court
outlined five factors used in deciding if comment concerning the defendant's silence
constitutes harmless error. See id. at 1201. These include: (1) the use to which the
prosecution puts the silence; (2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning; (3) the
quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; (4) the intensity and frequency of the
reference; and (5) the availability to the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a motion
for mistrial or to give curative instructions. See id. at 1201 (quoting United States v.
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c. Seventh Circuit
Courts in the Seventh Circuit have also disallowed comments by the
prosecution concerning the defendant's silence prior to arrest.'85 The
decisions, however, have not been entirely consistent."8
In United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 8 7 the court disallowed
comments by the prosecution about the defendant's pre-arrest
silence.' 88 In Lane, a fourteen-year-old defendant was charged with
the brutal murder of two of his teenage friends."8 The State presented
evidence that when police first questioned the defendant, a week after
the murders, the defendant said that "he didn't want to talk about it, he
didn't want to make any statements."'19° The prosecutor emphasized
this statement at closing argument.'9'
Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982)); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d
353, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1980). Applying these factors, the court found the error
harmless, because it determined that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict
regardless. See id.
185. See Fencl v. Abrahamson, 841 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel.
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of Fencl, see infra
notes 195-98 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Lane, see infra notes 187-94
and accompanying text.
186. See United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that comment concerning pre-arrest silence is admissible if the defendant
begins to answer questions, but then stops). For a discussion of Davenport, see infra
notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
187. 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
188. See id. at 1018.
189. See id. at 1012. Each victim suffered several stab wounds, one of them so severe
that her internal organs were exposed. See id. The defendant had been at the victims'
house the night before the bodies were found. See id. A two-year-old child of one of the
victims was found, still alive, in the house. See id. at 1013. Blood matching the
victims' was found on a pair of pants and blood was found on a knife owned by the
defendant. See id.
190. Id. at 1015. The defendant allegedly made several admissions to third parties on
the day of the murders. See id. at 1013. One witness testified that the defendant told her
he had been practicing karate with one of the victims and had "accidentally cut him or
something, by accident. But he was all right when he left." Id. Another witness
testified that the defendant told him he accidentally stabbed one of the victims. See id.
at 1014. When asked if the defendant said anything about the other victim, the witness
replied, "She came in the room and he stabbed her, I guess." Id.
191. See id. at 1015. The prosecutor made the following statement in his closing
argument:
I believe you heard that on that date of January 25th, 1977, Officers George
Pinkney and Edgar Hanes went to the Late Afternoon School to talk to Johnnie
Savory, who they thought might have some information regarding the case.
They asked him that afternoon about 3:30, they wanted to talk to him about
Scopie, what he might know. The Defendant, what did he say at that time,
ladies and gentlemen? "I don't want to talk about it. I won't make any
statements." This, ladies and gentlemen, the apparent good friend of his, he
doesn't want to talk about it, doesn't want to help the police at that time ....
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The court ruled that the holding in Griffin, that the government may
not comment on the defendant's silence at trial, applied equally to a
defendant's silence before trial, and even before arrest.' 92 The court
distinguished Jenkins and Fletcher, in which use of silence was held
admissible only for impeachment purposes.' 9 Accordingly, the court
found that the use of the defendant's silence to imply guilt was
"nothing short of incredible, given the language of our constitution and
the interpretation it has been consistently given," and held that the trial
court erred in allowing the comments.'l
Furthermore, in Fencl v. Abrahamson,95 the Seventh Circuit held
that prosecutorial comments and testimony concerning the defendant's
silence during pre-arrest questioning violated the Fifth Amendment."
In Fencl. the prosecution made a total of six references to the
defendant's silence in its opening and closing arguments and during
the testimony of the interrogating officer. 97 The Seventh Circuit
Id. The prosecutor argued that the victim and the defendant had been practicing karate
when the victim began to get the best of the defendant. See id. At this point, the
prosecutor contended, the defendant pulled out his knife and stabbed the victim. See id.
"He saw what he had done, ladies and gentlemen, and I would suggest to you he went
besirk [sic]. If you examine the photographs of the bodies in this case, this is not the
act of a sane person at that time." Id. at 1015-16.
192. See id. at 1017. The court also cited United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122,
1130 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that where impeachment by silence is
permissible, the prosecution may not also argue that this silence is inconsistent with
innocence. See Lane, 832 F.2d at 1017. Although Griffin dealt with the failure to take
the stand, and Shue was based on Due Process grounds, the Lane court found them
applicable to the use of pre-arrest silence to imply guilt. See id.
193. See id. at 1017-18. The court pointed out that the rule allowing use of silence
for impeachment exists because a defendant does not have a constitutional right to
perjure himself. See id. at 1017. For a discussion of Jenkins, see supra text
accompanying notes 81-93. For a discussion of Fletcher, see supra text accompanying
notes 95-98.
194. See id. at 1018. The court nevertheless found that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the state's overwhelmingly strong case. See id. at
1019.
195. 841 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1988).
196. Id. at 763. In Fencl, police were investigating the disappearance of a
Wisconsin woman when they found her purse in a plastic bag in a local river. See id. at
762. Among the items found in the purse was a parking ticket for the defendant's car.
See id. When the police questioned the defendant about the parking ticket, he refused to
answer and asked to speak with a lawyer. See id. The defendant was subsequently
charged with first degree murder. See id.
197. See id. At trial, the investigating officer testified that when initially questioned
without Miranda warnings, the defendant would not answer and wanted to speak to an
attorney. See id. The officer also testified that after Miranda warnings were read, the
defendant would not answer. See id. The prosecution also referred to the defendant's
silence in its opening and closing arguments. See id. The defendant was convicted and
sentenced to life in prison. See id.
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agreed with both the district court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the
government's use of his pre-arrest silence to imply guilt. tg
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit held in United States v.
Davenport'99 that the admission of evidence that a defendant refused to
answer questions does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege in
limited circumstances. 200 The court held in Davenport that once a
defendant voluntarily gives an investigator his version of events, he
forfeits his privilege not to answer questions concerning the version he
has given, and that a prosecutor may use silence to imply guilt in this
situation.20 '
In Davenport, the defendants began to answer an investigator's
202
questions prior to arrest, but refused to answer certain questions.
This selective refusal to answer was used against the defendants in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.2 3 The Seventh Circuit held that the trial
court did not err in admitting the defendants' refusal into evidence,
reasoning that once the defendants started answering questions, they
forfeited their privilege not to answer questions concerning the
information they gave to the investigators.2' Therefore, the court held
198. See id. at 765. The court agreed with the district court that any error resulting
from the allowance of comment on the defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was
harmless error. See id. at 769.
199. 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991).
200. Id. at 1174-75.
201. See id. A jury convicted the Davenports of having violated 31 U.S.C. §
5324(3), which prohibits structuring a cash transaction with a bank in order to prevent
the bank from filing currency transaction reports. See id. at 1171 (31 U.S.C. § 5324(3)
(1986)). The Davenports received approximately $100,000 and deliberately made
several small deposits to the bank in order to avoid having the bank report the
transactions to the IRS. See id. Prior to arrest, the Davenports were questioned by
federal agents about the violation. See id. The agents did not place the Davenports in
custody at that time and told them that they did not have to answer any questions. See id.
202. See id. Prior to arrest, the Davenports were questioned by federal agents about
the violation. See id. The agents did not place them in custody at this time. See id. The
Davenports began to answer questions, then refused to continue. See id. Mrs.
Davenport told the agents that they had received the money in inheritance upon her
husband's father's death. See id. Mr. Davenport claimed that the money was found in a
safe in his father's house. See id. Evidence at trial established, however, that the father
had been living in a car for six months prior to his death, died in poverty, and had been
buried at public expense. See id.
203. See id. at 1174-75. One of the questions Mrs. Davenport refused to answer was
"what her father-in-law's name was." Id. at 1175.
204. See id. at 1174-75. The court stated that to prohibit the comment "'would open
the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the
testimony."' Id. at 1174 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)).
The court also stated that even if the admission of this evidence was error, it would have
been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 1175.
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that the defendants forfeited their right to object to statements on their
refusal to answer these questions.20 5 The court reasoned that the
present situation was similar to the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach
a defendant who has taken the stand in his own defense. 20 6 The court
ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination should not be used to
in the criminal process by selectively answering
gain an advantage
20 7
questions.
Additionally, the court distinguished Miranda v. Arizona.208 The
court recognized that Miranda holds that a defendant does not waive
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by answering
questions and then "clam[ming] up," but stated that the Miranda
decision only applied to the coercive setting of a custodial interrogation
and not to pre-arrest interrogation. 20 9 For these reasons, the court held
that, when removed, from the coercive environment of a custodial
interrogation, a defendant's "willingness to answer some questions
can properly be given greater weight in deciding whether that
willingness should forfeit the right to object to comment on a refusal to
answer a particular question. 210
B. Result of the Split
The variation in treatment of comments on pre-arrest silence among
the circuit courts and the absence of controlling Supreme Court
205. See id. at 1174-75. Specifically, the court stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination is not a privilege to attempt to gain
an advantage in the criminal process, whether in its investigatory or its trial
stage, by selective disclosure followed by a clamming up. Having voluntarily
given the agent their version of the events, the Davenports forfeited their
privilege not to answer questions concerning that version.
Id.
206. See id. at 1174. The court stressed that a witness who "makes an incriminating
statement cannot use the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to block
cross-examination .... ." Id. The court compared this principle with the present
situation where the defendant began to answer an investigator's questions and then
clammed up. See id.
207. See id. at 1174-75.
208. See id. at 1175 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court
recognized that Miranda drew a sharp distinction between a witness at trial and a
defendant being questioned in custody. See id. Nevertheless, the court found the
Miranda decision inapplicable because the Davenport case did not involve a custodial
interrogation. See id.
209. See id. The court reasoned that the Miranda Court's emphasis was on the
coercive features of a custodial interrogation and was not intended to apply to a noncoercive pre-arrest situation. See id.
210. See id. The court stated that it did not consider the doubts created by Miranda to
be fatal to their position. See id.
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precedent has resulted in significant confusion among the circuits.2
In United States v. Thompson,1 2 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court's admission of a comment on the defendant's silence in the
prosecution's closing argument was not plain error.2t 3 In Thompson,
the defendant shot and killed a man in his house during an alleged drug
deal.21 4 When the police arrived, they did not arrest the defendant, but
instead, questioned him. 2 "5 The defendant began to cooperate, but
eventually refused to answer certain questions, stating he was scared
and wanted to speak with an attorney.21 6 At trial, the detective testified
about the defendant's refusal to answer and his requests for an
attorney.21 7 In the final remarks of his closing argument, the
prosecutor emphasized the detective's
testimony, implying that it was
218
indicative of the defendant's guilt.
The Ninth Circuit had never addressed the use of pre-arrest, preMiranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 2 9 The court noted
that it was not allowed to reverse for plain error if the issue was not
211. See, e.g., United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the defendant's silence was not protected under the Fifth Amendment as the silence
was not induced by a government agent and was not in response to a government agent's
questions); United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
due to the lack of controlling authority and the current circuit court split on the issue, the
court could not find "plain error" in the trial court's failure to exclude evidence of prearrest silence); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
outside the coercive setting of a custodial interrogation, willingness to answer some
questions can properly be given greater weight in deciding whether the willingness
forfeits the right to object to comment on a refusal to answer a particular question), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1031 (1992); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding that the government may comment on a defendant's silence if it occurs
before arrest and before Miranda warnings or after arrest but before Miranda warnings);
United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
government may use a defendant's silence against him when such silence occurs prior to
arrest or indictment and at a time when the defendant is not in custody); United States v.
Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that Jenkins may not allow the
prosecution to use evidence of pre-arrest silence, but declining to decide the issue as any
error resulting from the introduction of the defendant's silence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt).
212. 82 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996).
213. See id. at 856. For a quote of the prosecutor's comment, see supra text
accompanying note 11.
214. See id. at 851.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 854.
218. See id. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
219. See Thompson, 82 F.3d at 855. See also United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d
1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the court need not address the issue as the trial
court gave curative instruction telling jury not to consider silence as evidence of guilt).
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clear under current law.22 Citing the lack of controlling authority in
both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, and the significant split
among the circuits, the court concluded that the law surrounding the
use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantial evidence of guilt
" ' Therefore, the
was too unclear to permit a finding of plain error.22
defendant's conviction was upheld.'
C. Refusal of the Supreme Court to Clarify the Issue
The Supreme Court has never addressed the use of pre-arrest, preMiranda silence in the prosecution's case-in-chief as substantive
evidence of guilt.22 In Jenkins v. Anderson,224 the Court expressly
refused to decide whether such use violated a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege.225 Several petitions for certiorari have been

220. See Thompson, 82 F.3d at 856. The court stated that it was bound by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). See id.
The Olano Court held that one of the "limitations on appellate authority under Rule
52(b) is that the error be 'plain."" Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (stating that "'plain' is
synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious"'). The court stated that "[alt a
minimum, the Court of Appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the
error is clear under current law." Thompson, 82 F.3d at 855 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at
734).
221. See id. at 856. "Because of the circuit split, the lack of controlling authority,
and the fact that there is at least some room for doubt about the outcome of this issue, we
cannot brand the court's failure to exclude the evidence 'plain error.' We do not intend
by this result to express any opinion about the constitutionality of the prosecutor's
actions." Id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 855. "There is no controlling Supreme Court precedent." Id. The
Thompson court pointed out that the Supreme Court cases coming closest to deciding the
issue were Griffin, which held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from
commenting on an accused silence where the accused had refused to testify, and Jenkins,
which held that a prosecutor may use pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes. See
id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980)). However, neither of these cases addressed the use of pre-arrest silence for
the purposes of implying guilt. See id.
224. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
225. See id. at 236 n.2. The Court stated:
Our decision today does not consider whether or under what circumstances prearrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment. We simply do not
reach that issue because the rule of Raffel clearly permits impeachment even if
the pre-arrest silence were held to be an invocation of the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent.
Id. (citing Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)). The Raffel rule to which the
Jenkins Court referred provides that when a defendant takes the stand, the prosecution
may cross-examine him like any other witness and may ask him about his silence prior
to arrest. See Raffel, 271 U.S. at 496-97. For a further discussion of Jenkins, see supra
text accompanying notes 81-93.
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filed on the issue, but the Court has consistently denied them.226
Furthermore, the Court has heard challenges to evidentiary use of
silence in Grunewald v. United States2 7 and United States v. Hale.22
In both cases, however, the Court based its decision on the probative
value and prejudicial effect of the evidence rather than the Fifth
Amendment. 229 This split has left the lower courts to fend for
themselves, resulting in great inconsistency in the treatment of the
issue.230
IV. Analysis
Allowing a prosecutor in a criminal case to imply guilt from a
defendant's silence or refusal to answer police questions, is a violation
of the Fifth Amendment, whether the silence occurs before or after
arrest or Miranda warnings. 3 I The Fifth Amendment does not
provide that its protections are available only to persons in custody. 2
No evidence exists suggesting that the drafters wished to limit this
important constitutional protection to persons in custody. 3
A.

Use of Pre-ArrestSilence to Imply Guilt Negates the Value of the
PrivilegeAgainst SelfI-ncrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is "one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."' ' The right
to remain silent, which is derived from this privilege and which is
recognized as one of the most important constitutional rights, 5 will
have little value if this silence can later be used against a defendant at
226. See, e.g., United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169
(7th Cir. 1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989).
227. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For a discussion of Grunewald, see infra notes 274-75 and
accompanying text.
228. 422 U.S. 171 (1955). For a discussion of Hale, see supra text accompanying
notes 108-111.
229. See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 422-24; Hale, 422 U.S. at 179-80.
230. See supra Part III.A.
23 1. For a discussion of cases reaching this conclusion, see supra Part III.A.2 and
infra Part IV.C.
232. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
233. See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2252, at 324. Specifically,
Wigmore states that "[tihe probabilities substantially favor the conclusion that the
constitutional protections were originally intended only to prevent return to the hated
practice of compelling a person, in a criminal proceeding directed at him, to swear
against himself." Id.
234. GRISWOLD, supra note 26, at 7.
235. See id. at 7-9.
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trial. 2' A defendant cannot feel free to exercise his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent if the prosecution is allowed to use this silence
against him and imply that he is guilty.1 7 For the privilege against
self-incrimination to serve the purposes it was designed to serve, the
right to remain silent must carry with it the assurance that the silence
will later not be used against the defendant at trial.2 8
If the prosecution is allowed to imply guilt from a defendant's
silence in criminal trials, silence would essentially amount to an
admission of guilt; no intelligent defendant would remain silent before
arrest. 3 9 Such a policy would remove the protections of the Fifth
Amendment from persons not in police custody. 240 This result is
contrary to Supreme Court precedent.24 According to the Court in
Kastigar,the right to remain silent "can be asserted in any proceeding,
civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory .... *"242 Kastigar thus extends the privilege to persons
who are being questioned before arrest.243
The holding in Griffin v. California2 1 prohibiting comment on a
defendant's failure to testify should also be extended to prohibit
comment on silence before trial. 245 As interpreted by the Supreme
236. For a discussion of cases reaching this conclusion, see supra Part III.A.2.
237. See generally Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980) (noting that "[i]t
can be argued that a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure to speak later
can be used to impeach him").
238. See infra Part IV.C. Very few defendants exercising the right to remain silent
before arrest and before trial know that their silence could be used against them, or that
they would ever be charged in a criminal trial at which their silence would even be
relevant. See Poulin, supra note 6, at 210.
239. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1566 (1st Cir. 1989). "Any refusal to
speak, no matter how couched, in the face of police interrogation, raises an inference
that the person being questioned probably has something to hide." Id.
240. See id.
241. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (holding that the
Government may compel a witness to testify by conferring immunity from use of
compelled testimony in subsequent criminal prosecutions).
242. Id.
243. See id.; see also United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the admission of testimony that the defendant remained silent when
questioned prior to his arrest for tax evasion constituted plain error in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that a defendant's pre-arrest statement refusing confession was not
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832
F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the government may not comment on a
defendant's silence before trial even before arrest). For a discussion of Burson,
Coppola, and Lane, see supra Part III.A.2.
244. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
245. See United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (citing Griffin for the proposition that "once
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Court, the Fifth Amendment contains two privileges-the privilege to
refrain from taking the stand in defense and the privilege to refrain
from answering questions.246 Griffin protected the right to refrain
from taking the stand from prosecutorial comment.24 The Court
should similarly protect the privilege to refrain from answering
questions, whether the invocation of the right comes before or after
arrest or Miranda wamings. 2 8 The prejudice resulting from comments
on pre-arrest silence is arguably greater than the prejudice resulting
from comments on the failure to take the stand. 24 9 The jury can
observe for itself that the defendant failed to take the stand and is free
to draw its own inferences about this failure without any comments
from the prosecution. 25° Thus, little additional burden results when
the prosecutor comments on that silence.2 5' On the other hand, the
jury is completely unaware of the defendant's pre-arrest silence unless
evidence of that silence is permitted to be entered at trial. 52
B. Whether Silence Comes Before or After Miranda Warnings
Should be Irrelevant
The prosecution should not be allowed to use the defendant's
silence to show guilt regardless of whether the silence occurs before or
after Miranda warnings have been given. The Fifth Amendment does
not provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself unless he has not been read his Miranda
a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is impermissible for the prosecution to
refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which defendant exercised"). See supra Part III.A.2.
for further discussion of cases in the United States Court of Appeals reaching this
conclusion.
246. See, e.g., Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444.
247. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
248. See supra Part III.A.2.
249. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975) (holding that the probative
value of the defendant's post-arrest silence was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of
admitting it into evidence).
250. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 621 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Justice Stewart wrote: "It
is not, as I understand the problem, that the jury becomes aware that the defendant has
chosen not to testify in his own defense, for the jury will, of course, realize this quite
evident fact, even though the choice goes unmentioned.").
25 1. See id. at 620-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Since comment by counsel and the court does not compel testimony by
creating such an awareness, the Court must be saying that the California
constitutional provision places some other compulsion upon the defendant to
incriminate himself, some compulsion which the Court does not describe and
which I cannot readily perceive.
Id. at 621.
252. See Poulin, supra note 6,at 210.
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rights.253 No evidence exists that the drafters of the Constitution
intended to limit the full protections of the Fifth Amendment to persons
in custody or persons informed of their rights. 2 m Furthermore, the
refusal to apply the Fifth Amendment to proceedings occurring before
arrest is contrary to Supreme Court precedent255 For example, the
Court in Kastigar v. United States extended the privilege to persons
who are being questioned before arrest during an investigation.'
One of the principal reasons given in Miranda v. Arizona for the
requirement that a defendant be read his rights before questioning is
that the custodial interrogation process contains "inherently compelling
pressures" that weaken the accused's power to resist and which
compel him to speak. 25 Arguably, these pressures are present in a
non-custodial, pre-arrest situation as well. A person being questioned
by police in connection with a crime may be very fearful that if he does
not cooperate, he will be arrested and prosecuted. This fear may
compel him to speak when he otherwise would not do so. In fact, a
person may feel more compelled to speak before arrest, when he
knows that if he does not cooperate he may be arrested, than after
arrest when he has been told he may remain silent. Furthermore,
interrogators can use the same techniques of persuasion and
compulsion both before and after arrest.'
The great emphasis placed on the reading of Miranda warnings by
the Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio259 and Fletcher v. Weir 26 is
misplaced. These decisions reason that the Mirandawarnings contain
an implicit assurance that the defendant's silence will not be used
against him. 26 ' Thus, they reason that it is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment for the defendant's silence to be used against him, where
the warnings may have encouraged the silence. 262
253. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
254. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2252, at 324. See also supra note 223
(quoting Wigmore's conclusion that the drafters of the Constitution did not intend to
limit Fifth Amendment protection to persons in custody).
255. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
256. See id. The Court stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege "can be asserted in
any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory." Id. (emphasis added).
257. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
258. See supra note 67 (discussing the coercive nature of custodial interrogations).
259. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). For a further discussion of Doyle, see supra text
accompanying notes 102-07.
260. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curium). For a further discussion of Fletcher, see supra
text accompanying notes 95-98.
261. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606.
262. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18; Fletcher,455 U.S. at 606-07. The Doyle and
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The Doyle and Fletcherdecisions fail to recognize that the assurance
that a defendant's silence will not be used against him is present even
if the Miranda warnings have not been read. 26 Most Americans can
recite the Miranda warnings by heart from having heard them
repeatedly on television. 2" Thus, a defendant already knows that he
has the right to remain silent before he is told, and undoubtedly
believes that his silence could not be used against him even if Miranda
warnings are never read. 265 A defendant's silence should not be used
against him in a situation where he reasonably relies on the belief that
his silence will not be used against him. The possibility that a
defendant's silence could be used against him would certainly
influence his decision to remain silent.2"
C. Use of Silence to Imply Guilt Violates the Functionsof the Fifth
Amendment
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects defendants from being
forced to incriminate themselves.2 67 The privilege forces the
government to obtain, from other sources, sufficient evidence to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2' If the government
is allowed to rely on the use of the defendant's silence as evidence of
guilt, it obtains an admission by silence. 269 To transform the
defendant's silence into a testimonial admission and substitute it for the
testimonial admission that the government was unable to obtain
undermines the Fifth Amendment's policy of placing the entire burden
of proof upon the State.2
Fletcher decisions seem to be saying that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights do not
arise until the Miranda warnings are read.
263. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606.
264. See United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.11 (5th Cir. 1981). The
court noted that Miranda "warnings are well established and mechanical in nature. Most
ten year old children who are permitted to stay up late enough to watch police shows on
television can probably recite them as well as any police officer." Id. The defendant
who is not familiar with the Miranda warnings needs a lot more help than the Fifth
Amendment can give him.
265. See id.; see also Poulin, supra note 6, at 210 (noting that "[flew defendants
exercising the privilege before trial would know that their silence could be used as
evidence, or that there would ever be a criminal trial at which their silence might be
relevant").
266. See Poulin, supra note 6, at 210.
267. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2263, at 379 (stating "[ilt is not merely any
and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the
constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion").
268. See Poulin, supra note 6, at 210-11.
269. See id. at 211.
270. See id. at 210-11.
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Allowing the prosecution to use a defendant's silence to imply guilt
also violates the Fifth Amendment's function of protecting the
innocent.2 7' For example, a defendant charged with murder may have
killed in justifiable self-defense.272 If the defendant is afraid that the
police will not believe his story, or feels morally responsible for the
death, he may claim the Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to
answer questions prior to arrest.2' To allow this silence to be used to
show the defendant's guilt would defeat the important Fifth
Amendment purpose of protecting the innocent.274 Those who would
allow the prosecution to imply guilt from silence assume that those
who remain silent are guilty, which is not only frequently untrue, but
also inconsistent
with the Fifth Amendment's policy of protecting the
27
innocent. 1
Finally, policy behind the privilege against self-incrimination is to
prevent defendants from being subjected to the "cruel trilemma" of
self-accusation, perjury, and contempt. 276 When a defendant's silence
is used to imply his guilt, a "new trilemma" results: (1) the defendant
may make a self-accusation by affirmative statement; (2) he may make

271. See id. at 212.
272. See GRISWOLD, supra note 26, at 9. Griswold used this example to illustrate the
policy of the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect the innocent. See id.
273. See Poulin, supra note 6, at 212.
274. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). The Court in Grunewald
held that an implication of guilt could not be drawn from the fact that the defendant
invoked the right to remain silent before a grand jury, and that this silence was not a
proper subject of cross-examination of the defendant. See id. at 421. The Grunewald
Court stated that:
Recent re-examination of the history and meaning of the Fifth Amendment has
emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of the privilege is to protect
innocent men. Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this
privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who
invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the
privilege. The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might
be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted).
275. See id. See also Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58
(1956). The Court stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery
if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a
conclusive presumption of perjury . . . . [A] witness may have a reasonable
fear of prosecution and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing. The privilege
serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous
circumstances.
Id. (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-28 (1956); GRISWOLD, supra
note 26, at 19-21).
276. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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a self-accusation by silence; or (3) he may perjure himself.2 7 7
Therefore, if the accused is not allowed to remain silent without
worrying that his silence will be used against him, he has an extremely
unattractive choice-he may either incriminate himself or perjure
himself.27' In this situation, the defendant does not have the option of
suffering the penalty of contempt rather than incriminating himself.' 9
D. Probative Value of Silence is Low, While PrejudicialEffect is
High
The probative value of pre-arrest silence, when used to imply the
defendant's guilt, is extremely low. 280 Mere silence, whether it comes
before or after arrest, is ambiguous and does not necessarily make it
more probable than not that the defendant is attempting to hide
something, or is guilty. 28 ' Several innocent explanations may exist for
the silence.282 First, the defendant may have remained silent out of
fear or intimidation resulting from an hostile and unfamiliar
situation. 8 3 Being questioned by the police under the threat of arrest
and prosecution can be just as frightening and intimidating as a
custodial interrogation. Second, the defendant may have remained
silent to protect someone else.2 ' Third, an innocent defendant may
have been advised by his attorney to remain silent.285 Fourth, the
defendant, in these emotional and confusing circumstances, may not
have heard or fully understood the question.' Likewise, the accused
may not have remembered certain events at the time he was questioned
or may not have felt they were significant. Finally, the defendant may
reasonably believe that he has the right to remain silent, and that his
silence cannot and will not be used against him. 2s7 His silence may be
nothing more than an exercise of his Miranda rights, which he has
277. See Poulin, supra note 6, at 211.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975). Justice Marshall wrote,
"In most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force." Id.
281. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). The Doyle Court called postarrest silence "insolubly ambiguous." Id.
282. See Hale, 422 U.S. at 176. The Court stated, "In light of the many alternative
explanations for his pretrial silence, we do not think it sufficiently probative of an
inconsistency with his in-court testimony to warrant admission of evidence thereof."
Id.
283. Id. at 177.
284. See id.
285. See Poulin, supra note 6, at 210.
286. See Hale, 422 U.S. at 177.
287. See id. at 183 (White, J., concurring).

220

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

heard dozens of times in television shows and movies.m An innocent
defendant may believe that remaining silent is wiser than taking the
chance of making a mistake and suffering an unjustified arrest and
prosecution. 289
On the other hand, the prejudicial effect of using pre-arrest silence is
very high. 290 The Supreme Court recognized the potential for
overwhelming prejudicial effect in Hale when it pointed out the
significant danger that the jury will attach much more weight to the
prior silence than is justified. 29 ' Allowing the defendant to explain his
silence at trial is not sufficient to overcome the negative inference the
jury is likely to draw, that the defendant would not have remained
silent unless he had something to hide. 2' Since the probative value of
pre-arrest silence is low and the potential for prejudice is high,
evidence of pre-arrest silence should be excluded when it is used to
imply that the defendant is guilty.293
E. Pre-ArrestSilence Should Be Admittedfor Impeachment Purposes
Unlike the use of silence to show guilt, the use of pre-arrest silence
to impeach a defendant's testimony if he takes the stand in his own
defense should be permitted, as provided in Jenkins v. Anderson.2 4
The use of silence for impeachment purposes does not result in the
unfairness that is present in the use of silence to imply guilt.2 95 The
288. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
289. See Hale, 422 U.S. at 177.
290. See id. at 180.
291. See id. "We now conclude that the respondent's silence during police
interrogation lacked significant probative value and that any reference to his silence
under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact." Id.
292. See id.
293. See id. The Court further noted that "[wihen the risk of confusion is so great as
to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out." Id. (quoting Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933)). Aside from any Constitutional considerations,
silence could arguably be excluded on a purely evidentiary basis. Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part that, "[although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice .. " FED. R. EvID. 403.
294. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). For a complete discussion of Jenkins, see supra text
accompanying notes 81-93.
295. See United States ex rel Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Lane court pointed out that impeachment is designed to detect perjury and that a
defendant does not have a constitutional right to perjure himself. Further, the Lane court
reasoned that the cases which have allowed impeachment by silence have relied on the
fact that "the defendant opens himself to impeachment by taking the stand." Id. at
1017-18. "In sum, we believe that the state's suggestion that use of a defendant's
silence to impeach his trial testimony presents a constitutional issue, but use of his
silence to imply guilt does not, is nothing sort of incredible, given the language of our
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fundamental difference between using pre-arrest silence to imply guilt
and using it to impeach is that the defendant opens the door to
impeachment evidence when he takes the stand and gives his version
of events.2" Thus, he should not be able to object if the prosecution
cross-examines him about the version he tells the jury. 2'
V. PROPOSAL

Since the use of the defendant's pre-arrest silence in the
prosecution's case-in-chief to imply guilt violates the defendant's
constitutional rights, and because several circuits are split on the
issue,29 the Supreme Court should grant certiorariand resolve the
confusion. In cases such as United States v. Thompson, courts have
refused to overturn convictions based on the use of silence to imply
guilt due to the lack of clarity and agreement on the issue among the
circuits. 2 ' This issue demands uniform treatment among all federal
and state courts.
The Supreme Court should rule that any prosecutorial comment on a
defendant's silence or refusal to answer questions, when used to imply
the defendant's guilt, is a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and is therefore improper. 00 The
prosecution should not be allowed to comment on silence in its casein-chief for any reason.3"' Comments in both the opening and closing
arguments and testimony on the witness stand about a defendant's
silence should be disallowed for the purpose of showing the

constitution and the interpretation it has been consistently given." Id. at 1018.
296. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. See also Lane, 832 F.2d at 1017-18 (discussing
the difference between these two uses of silence).
297. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. Note, however, that the Jenkins Court did state
that states were free to formulate evidentiary rules to determine when silence is more
probative than prejudicial. See id. The Court commented in Doyle that "we recognize,
of course, that unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment
cross-examination, some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function
of a trial by presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge." Doyle,
426 U.S. at 619 n.7. See also generally Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315
(1900) (stating "[w]hile no inference of guilt can be drawn from his refusal to avail
himself of the privilege of testifying, he has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts
which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon these
facts").
298. See supra Part III.A-B.
299. 82 F.3d 849, 856 (1996). See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Thompson.
300. For a discussion of United States Court of Appeals cases reaching this
conclusion, see supra Parts III.A.2, IV.C.
301. See supra Part III.A.2.
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defendant's guilt. 302 Such comment on silence should be disallowed
regardless of whether the silence occurs before or after arrest, whether
the defendant has been given Miranda warnings, or whether the
defendant begins to answer questions and then refuses to answer any
more questions .303 Defendants such as Mr. Thompson, who believe
they have an unconditional right to remain silent, should be protected
on their silence when that silence is used to show their
from comment
14
guilt.
A Supreme Court holding that the use of pre-arrest silence is
impermissible to imply guilt would not disturb the rule laid down in
Jenkins v. Anderson,3° ' which allows such comment to impeach a
defendant's credibility if he takes the stand in his own defense. 3 ' In
the Jenkins situation, the defendant has waived his right to remain
silent by attempting to explain his behavior.' The prosecution should
be allowed to rebut this explanation with evidence of the defendant's
silence or refusal to give this explanation to the police immediately
after the crime. 308 The inherent unfairness present in the use of
comment to imply guilt is not present in the use of comment for
impeachment purposes." Use of silence for impeachment purposes
should still be permissible, but using silence to imply the defendant's
guilt when the defendant does not take the stand in his own defense
should not be permissible.310
Furthermore, trial courts should be required to distinguish the use of
silence for impeachment purposes from the use of silence to imply
guilt. 31' The burden should be on the prosecution to convince the
court that the defendant's silence is being used for impeachment and
not to imply the defendant's guilt. The court should have discretion to
disallow the evidence if it finds that the prosecution is using the silence
302. See supra Parts III.A.2, IV.C.
303. See supra Parts III.A.2, IV.B. See supra notes 234-48 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the irrelevance of the timing of the Miranda warnings for purposes of
Fifth Amendment protections.
304. See Thompson, 82 F.3d at 854-56. See supra Parts I, III.A.2.
305. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
306. See id. at 239-40.
307. See id. at 240.
308. See id.
309. See supra Part IV.E.
310. See supra Part IV.E.
311. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.E (discussing that where a defendant does not testify,
allowing the prosecution to introduce pre-arrest silence into evidence would unfairly
prejudice the jury; however, once a defendant takes the stand and gives his testimony, he
opens the door to admission of impeachment evidence, including evidence of pre-arrest
silence).
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to imply guilt. Further, the trial court should be required to give a
limiting instruction to the jury, ordering them only to consider the
defendant's silence for impeachment purposes and not to infer that he
is guilty simply because he was silent.3 Allowing the introduction of
silence to imply guilt should be considered "plain error" by the trial
court and should be grounds for reversal on appeal if the appellate
court determines that the error was not harmless. 3 In making this
determination, appellate courts should give great deference to the
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court should restore the inalienable constitutional
protection against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment
and affirm that a defendant in the United States has a constitutional
right to remain silent, without being concerned that his silence may be
used against him. 31 4 The right to remain silent means very little to a
criminal defendant unless he is certain that his silence will not be used
as an admission of guilt at trial.3 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "no person.., shall be
31 6
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
According to the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,1 7 one of the
inalienable rights contained in the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is the right to remain silent.3" 8 Although the
Supreme Court has held that a defendant's silence after arrest and his
refusal at trial to take the stand in his own defense cannot be used
against him in the prosecution's case-in-chief to imply his guilt," 9 the
Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether the defendant's
silence before arrest or Miranda warnings can be used against him in
the prosecution's case-in-chief.320
Several of the circuits of the United States Court of Appeals are split
on the issue of whether prosecutorial comment on pre-arrest silence is
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 32 ' The Fifth and
312. See supra note 219.
3 13. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part III.A.2.
315. See supra Part III.A.2.
316. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
317. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
318. See id. at 444.
319. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the
defendant's refusal to testify cannot be used against him).
320. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855-56 (1996).
321. See supra Part III.A.
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Eleventh Circuits have allowed comments on a defendant's silence if
the silence occurred before Miranda warnings. 322 In contrast, the
First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that prosecutorial
comments on a defendant's silence are impermissible regardless of
whethergs.
the
323defendant was in custody or had been given Miranda

warnin

Allowing a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's silence in its
case-in-chief violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, whether the silence occurs before or after arrest or
Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court should resolve the confusion
among the circuits and hold that the use of silence to imply guilt is a
violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, even if the
silence occurred before arrest. The defendant's inalienable right to
remain silent should be restored, because the Constitution was "framed
for ages to come and ... designed to approach immortality as nearly
as human institutions can approach it."324
AARON R. PETI'T

322. See, e.g., United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v.
Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d
1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
324. Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821) (John
Marshall, C.J.).

